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1 Introduction  
 
 
 
Over the past decade the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has increasingly 
become the whipping post of those that criticise globalisation. There have been 
violent expressions of this critique on the streets of cities around the world. But 
the critique has also arisen in documents of respected international 
organisations. A striking example is the report on globalisation and human 
rights written in 2000 by two special rapporteurs of the United Nations Sub-
Commission on Human Rights in which the WTO is described as being a 
‘veritable nightmare’ for developing countries.1
The main critique on the WTO is that its activities have serious human rights 
implications and that the organisation as such does not properly address the 
human rights aspects of these activities.
  
 
2
                                            
* Jeroen Denkers, LLM, and Dr Nicola Jägers both work for the Centre for Transboundary 
Legal Development, Tilburg University, the Netherlands. This article emanates from the 
summer/winter course on Good Governance held in Tilburg in January 2007. This course 
is a cooperative initiative between North-West University in South Africa and Tilburg 
University, the Netherlands. 
1  Oloka-Onyango and Udagama Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Preliminary report 
submitted in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8. 
2  Ibid par 15. 
 The present article will address the 
question as to the human rights implications of its activities. We will 
demonstrate that generally the WTO as an international organisation does not 
directly violate human rights. The WTO cannot be compared to other 
international organisations which operations may violate human rights of 
individuals. To make this clear we will, in the first part of this article, examine to 
what extent the WTO has been attributed international legal personality, that is, 
was given certain autonomy by its founders. Subsequently, it will be argued that 
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even though the WTO does not violate human rights directly its activities can 
have implications for the enjoyment and protection of human rights. 
 
Realisation of human rights requires an enabling environment. In other words, 
supportive governmental elites and bureaucrats are essential. This has given 
rise to the doctrine of good governance, which deals with processes aimed at 
creating a societal climate where human rights can be realised. The role of 
good governance in the promotion of human rights has been acknowledged by 
the Commission on Human Rights in 2000 when it stated that – 
 
…transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory govern-
ment, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, is the 
foundation on which good governance rests, and (...) such a 
foundation is a sine qua non for the promotion of human rights.3
…[g]ood governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and 
enlightened policy-making (that is, transparent processes); a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of 
government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.
 
 
In 1989, the World Bank first evolved a doctrine of good governance, which it 
described in the following terms: 
 
4
…good governance at the international level and on transparency in 
the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are committed to an 
open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory 
multilateral trading and financial system.
  
 
Most international organisations have responded to the call for good 
governance by adopting strategies aimed at enhancing processes of 
transparency, participation and accountability. The United Nations underlined 
the importance of the good governance doctrine in its Millennium Declaration. 
In paragraph 13 it is stated that the fight against extreme poverty and towards 
securing development depends inter alia on:  
 
5
 
 
                                            
3  Commission on Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/ 24 Jun. 
4  World Bank Governance at vii. 
5  GA Res 55/2, 8 September 2000. 
J DENKERS & N JÄGERS  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
90/252 
There is now a sprawling body of literature on the concept of good governance. 
Various definitions exist and many different principles can be identified.6 The 
common principles that can be deduced from the various definitions are 
transparency, accountability, participation, rule of law, effectiveness, efficiency, 
proportionality, consistency and coherence. In this article, we concentrate on 
the good governance principles of transparency and participation in relation to 
the WTO. These principles are, as will be explained,7
…[r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the 
optional use of the world’s resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in 
a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.
 of particular importance 
for this organisation. Even though, the WTO as an organisation does not 
directly violate human rights we will make clear that as the exponent of trade 
liberalisation it does have a role to play when it comes to human rights.  
 
We argue that a further incorporation of good governance principles will help 
the WTO achieve its ultimate aim which as can be deduced from the preamble 
of the agreement establishing the WTO, is not trade liberalisation. According to 
the preamble the Member States of the WTO –  
 
8
                                            
6  Eg, good governance according to the European Commission means “rules, processes 
and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, 
particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence”. See Commission of the European Communities 
 
 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 24 
Jun. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
distinguishes the following characteristics of good governance: “It is participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimised, 
the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in 
society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs 
of society.” See UNESCAP http://www.unescap.org/ 16 Jun. 
7  See par 3.1. 
8  Emphasis added. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 
United Nations Treaty Series, 33 International Legal Materials 1125 (1994), entered into 
force 1 January 1995. 
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In other words, free trade is not an aim in itself but a means to achieve the aim 
of sustainable development. Given the role of principles of good governance in 
the realisation of human rights, good governance also plays an important role in 
realising this aim.  
 
 
2 What role does the WTO play regarding human rights? 
2.1 The World Trade Organisation: a brief overview 
The WTO was established in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT, which initially was intended as a 
temporary framework, had served as the institutional basis for the world’s 
multilateral trade system for 47 years. However, by the 1980s the system 
needed a thorough overhaul. Over the years the multilateral trading system had 
become more and more liberal through successive rounds of trade 
negotiations. World trade had become far more complex: global economic 
integration was underway and trade in services which became of interest to an 
increasing number of countries was not covered by GATT.9 As of that moment 
the WTO was established as the new institutional foundation of the multilateral 
trade system. As stated in the introduction, the preamble to the agreement 
proves that free trade is not the ultimate goal of the organisation. Rather, the 
WTO should be seen as an organisation that facilitates the reduction of trade 
barriers and pursues equality in market access between members.10
The organisation has been described as being a code of conduct as well as a 
negotiating forum.
 
 
11
                                            
9  WTO 
 The WTO offers States a forum to negotiate on 
international trade rules that regulate their trade policies. In this respect, the 
preamble to the agreement establishing the WTO holds that its Member States 
should contribute to the WTO –  
 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.doc 4 May. 
10  Hoekman and Kostecki Political Economy 13. 
11  Ibid p 3. 
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objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations. 
 
But if it seems at first glance that the WTO is not much more than a negotiation 
forum and a code of conduct, then how does this relate to the human rights 
critique that the organisation is often subject to? In an attempt to answer this 
question the following section will focus on the question to what extent the 
organisation bears rights and duties under international law in detachment from 
its members. In essence, this is the question to the autonomy given to it by its 
founders. Subsequently, the question to the human rights impact of the 
described autonomous operations of the organisation will be dealt with. 
 
2.2 The international legal personality of the WTO 
Before human rights accountability of an international organisation can be 
established it is first necessary to examine its position in public international 
law. Legally speaking, international organisations can only be held accountable 
if they have actual duties in international law, which they violate rather than the 
Member States acting as a collectivity.12 In other words, does an entity bear 
separate rights and duties under international law? States are the traditional 
subjects of international law and have full legal personality. International 
organisations, however, are created by these original subjects. They are 
attributed rights and duties by States. Therefore, organisations which have 
been attributed such international legal personality are frequently defined as 
ancillary subjects of international law.13
In order to determine to what extent an international organisation such as the 
WTO is an international legal person it is necessary to examine to what extent it 
is a distinct entity from its Member States. Has it been given certain autonomy 
by its creators? The WTO is often referred to as a member-driven organisation. 
As was said earlier, it is a negotiation platform where States negotiate trade 
  
 
                                            
12  Amerasinghe Principles 78. 
13  Cassese International Law 71. 
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rules that they will have to implement accordingly. It is States that are bound by 
human rights obligations in the negotiation and implementation process. Legally 
speaking, they are responsible if they violate human rights in the 
implementation of trade rules that they have negotiated. If States, for instance, 
would not be allowed under WTO law (which they have negotiated) to ban 
dangerous products which may jeopardise public health it is the importing State 
that would be accountable for a violation of the right to health. It has even been 
argued that developed States may be accountable for certain trade affecting 
policies such as subsidisation that may have negative impacts on development 
in developing countries.14
2.3 How does the WTO affect human rights? 
 It is for this reason that States make human rights 
impact assessments in the process of negotiating new international trade rules. 
 
The foregoing illustrates that it is not the organisation as such that is 
responsible for human rights violations in these processes but rather its 
Member States. This may be different in other international organisations with 
more autonomous powers such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 
which its operations and policies may have decisive effects on the lives of 
people.15 In contrast to IMF decision-making, decisions within the WTO are 
taken by consensus.16
                                            
14   See for instance, 3Dthree 
 Yet, also within the WTO there are parts of the 
organisation that have been attributed certain autonomy and whose activities 
may have human rights implications. First of all, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Rulings of the panels and the Appellate Body are binding and the 
Member States have a duty to comply with its rulings. The position of this body 
in detachment of its members gives it certain rights and obligations under 
international law. Because its binding judgments may compel a state to adopt 
one policy rather than another, its decisions may have an impact on state 
policies to protect human rights. This particular matter will be dealt with in the 
next section.  
 
http://www.3dthree.org/ 22 Jun. 
15  See Skogly Human rights obligations.  
16  See supra n 10 at 41. 
J DENKERS & N JÄGERS  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
94/252 
Dispute settlement is not the only activity of the organisation that may have 
human rights implications. Two more activities that the WTO exercises with 
certain autonomy from its Member States and which may have human rights 
implications will be discussed here. Although these activities do not bind the 
Member States like the WTO dispute settlement mechanism they may have a 
human rights impact in a normative sense. It concerns the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) and technical assistance. Trade Policy Review is the 
regular surveillance of national trade policies by the Trade Policy Review Body, 
which is meant to enhance the transparency of members’ trade policies and 
examine the impact of such trade policies and practices of members on the 
trading system. The review takes place every two, four or six years depending 
on the Member State’s share of world trade and consists of a report prepared 
by the government concerned and by the WTO Secretariat.17 The reviews are 
not legally binding. It is explicitly stated that the mechanism is designed only to 
increase transparency and understanding and is not intended to impose new 
policy commitments on the Member States. Another activity of the WTO 
concerns technical assistance such as training programmes meant to help 
developing and least developed countries to adjust to WTO rules.18
2.4 WTO dispute settlement and its human rights impact 
  
 
None of these activities would directly violate human rights for which the WTO 
can be held accountable. However, non-legally binding statements where 
national policies are evaluated in isolation from non-trade issues may have a 
normative impact. The fact that the WTO should not be considered to be 
disconnected from human rights issues becomes especially apparent in the 
rulings of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which may require a state to 
adapt its policies for the protection of human rights. Therefore, this issue will be 
dealt with in more detail in the next section.  
 
As was stated above, it is hard to think of an example where the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism would directly violate human rights. Basically, this organ 
                                            
17  Ibid at 45. 
18  Id and WTO http://www.wto.org/ 22 Jun. 
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examines if a state’s conduct is in conformity with obligations under the WTO 
agreements when a complaint is received. It thus examines whether certain 
trade measures are allowed under WTO law. In this way its judgments may 
have an impact on human rights protection. Trade measures are often used to 
secure compliance with human rights. In this respect, ‘outwardly-directed’ trade 
measures as opposed to ‘inwardly-directed’ trade measures can be 
distinguished.19 If it concerns the latter type of measures, a state adopts trade 
measures in order not to violate its own human rights obligations. A state, for 
instance, may want to restrict the import of asbestos products in order to 
protect public health within its own territory. Obviously, it is the most common 
form of trade measures for the protection of human rights since states are 
primarily obliged to respect, protect and fulfil human rights obligations within 
their own jurisdiction.20
Such outwardly-directed trade measures are either of the positive or negative 
kind. They can generally be divided into trade concessions or trade restrictions. 
An example of the former is the General System of Preferences (GSP) the EU 
and the US have to grant non-reciprocal trade benefits to developing countries 
under the condition that they comply with an agreed set of human rights. 
Granting benefits to one country over another, which would usually be in 
violation of the GATT,
 
 
However, it is also feasible that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism at 
some point will be asked to rule on the lawfulness of trade restrictions for the 
protection of human rights elsewhere. For trade measures have been a 
commonly used means by states to make other states comply with their human 
rights obligations in international law. 
 
21 is permitted under the enabling clause if the benefit is 
granted to a developing country.22
                                            
19  Charnovitz 1998 Virg J of Int’l L 689-746. 
20  See Shue Basic Rights; Alston and Tomasevski (eds) Right to Food; Eide Right to 
Adequate Food; Maastricht Guidelines 1998 Human Rights Quarterly 691-705.  
21  It concerns the most-favoured-nation clause which means that if a Member State grants a 
trade benefit to one state it should grant the same benefit to all other Member States. 
22  GATT BISD 26S/203, adopted 28 November 1979. 
 The question if these benefits may be 
subject to certain conditions, such as respect for human rights, is not entirely 
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clear however. WTO case law suggests that preferential tariff treatment must 
be non-discriminatory in that similar benefits are accessible to similar situated 
developing countries.23
When it comes to trade restrictions, such as selective procurement policies, 
import or export prohibitions, tariffs et cetera, this may be problematic. A brief 
look into state practice suggests that the use of trade restrictions to induce 
other states to comply with their international obligations is not uncommon in 
international law.
 
 
24 The US, for instance, in 1978 adopted a trade embargo that 
violated their GATT obligations against Uganda in response to genocide 
committed by the Ugandan government.25
review (…) the relations they may have with the Member State 
concerned and take appropriate measures to ensure that the said 
Member cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or 
extend the system of forced or compulsory labour referred to by the 
Commission of Inquiry and to contribute as far as possible to the 
implementation of its recommendations.
 In April 1982, when Argentina took 
control over part of the Falkland Islands, the European Community, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada adopted trade sanctions, including a temporary 
import barrier against Argentinean products in violation of their GATT 
obligations. Another example is the rather unique case of Burma (Myanmar). 
Here, the International Labour Conference for the first time in its history 
recommended states, employers and workers to  
 
26
As a result of the ILC recommendation the US adopted the Burmese Freedom 
and Democracy Act which prohibits all imports from Burma.
  
 
27
                                            
23  WTO Doc WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2004, par 129, 187-189. 
24  Crawford Third Report on State Responsibility 14. Crawford cites the Uganda Embargo 
Act.  
25  Ibid. Note that in this case the US did not rely on GATT exceptions but on its obligations 
under general international law. 
26  Resolution Concerning the Measures Recommended by the Governing Body under Article 
33 of the ILO Constitution on the Subject of Myanmar, 88th session, June 2000, par 1(b). 
Also see Maupain Upholding Workers' Rights 85-142; Vandaele International Labour 
Rights 629. 
27  Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act HR 2330, 2003.  
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It seems that states, when adopting such trade restrictions, often claim that 
they are obliged to do so under general international law. This raises the 
question if such legal basis can be found in general international law. In this 
respect article 41(2) of the Articles on States Responsibility (ASR) as drafted by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) may be of particular relevance.28 It 
holds that states are under a negative obligation not to recognise as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm and not to render 
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.29 The ILC finds confirmation in 
Security Council resolutions “prohibiting any aid or assistance in maintaining 
the illegal apartheid regime in South Africa or Portuguese colonial rule”.30 More 
importantly, the ICJ also explicitly referred to the existence of such obligation in 
the Israeli Wall case.31
It seems that states in realising this obligation may violate other norms of 
international law such as international trade law. This can be illustrated by the 
abovementioned example of the US trade embargo in 1978 adopted against 
Uganda in response to genocide committed by the Ugandan government. The 
US claimed that it “should take steps to dissociate itself from any government 
which engages in the international crime of genocide”.
 
 
32
                                            
28  Although these articles do not constitute a binding legal instrument as such it may be 
considered an influential source since they are an attempt to reflect state practice.  
29  Gattini makes clear that the ILC through these obligations “gave substance to the 
fundamental idea of the social ban on and isolation of the outlaw”. Note that art 16 deals 
with assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. In contrast, art 41 
“deals with conduct ‘after the fact’ which assists the responsible State in maintaining a 
situation opposable to all States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a 
situation which is maintained in violation of international law”. Gattini 2002 Eur J Int’l L 
1181-1199.  
 Admittedly, 
maintaining trade relations in such cases would be tantamount to rendering aid 
or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the ongoing breach. As the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) held with regard to 
systematic and widespread forced labour in Burma: 
 
30  UN http://untreaty.un.org/ 7 May at 291. 
31  ICJ Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory Advisory Opinion 9 July 2004 http://www.icj-cij.org/ 12 Jan at par 159. 
32  Crawford Third Report on State Responsibility 14. Crawford cites the Uganda Embargo 
Act. Note that in this case the US did not rely on GATT exceptions but on its obligations 
under general international law. 
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It is impossible to conduct any business relationship in Burma 
without directly or indirectly supporting the Burmese military 
dictatorship which is responsible for the extensive use of forced 
labor, as well as other serious human and trade union rights 
violations.33
Are countries required to prohibit all imports from the exporting 
country (even goods not made with child labor)? After all, a total 
embargo is even more likely to induce the exporting country to 
prohibit child labor than is a ban on the importation of one product. 
On this view, failure to impose a complete embargo would be 
tantamount to ‘encouragement’ or ‘support’ of child labor.
 
 
To sum up, it has been demonstrated that under general international law on 
state responsibility, states have the obligation not to render aid or assistance 
with regard to a serious breach of a peremptory norm. The substance of this 
obligation however, may not always be clear. In the case of Burma it is evident 
that the Burmese regime is directly responsible for the serious violation of 
international law. Any support to that regime would therefore boil down to a 
violation of the obligation not to render aid. This may, however, be different if it 
is a non-governmental actor rather than a government that does not respect a 
peremptory norm. When it comes to violations of labour rights it is often 
corporations that do not respect these norms rather than the state. This raises 
the question if the obligation not to render aid or assistance can also be fulfilled 
by tailored sanctions against corporations or certain industries that do not 
respect such norms. One can think of import prohibitions targeted against 
products. In the words of Vázquez: 
 
34
                                            
33  See Jägers quoting a press release of the ICFTU of 15 November 2001. Jägers Corporate 
Human Rights Obligations 94. 
34  Vázquez 2003 JIEL 797-839. 
 
 
It can be concluded that states are under the obligation not to render aid or 
assistance in the case of a serious violation of a peremptory norm. It is open for 
further debate whether this obligation stretches beyond the adoption of tailored 
sanctions. 
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What seems clear is that if states are under such obligation it is feasible that 
the WTO ‘judiciary’35 may have to decide on the legality of such measures 
under WTO law. 36 In fact, the chances that this will happen have increased 
with the establishment of the WTO. In the old GATT system trade rules were 
often bent and even broken because no effective dispute settlement system 
existed. Rulings could be easily blocked by one of the parties to a dispute. 
Hence, states could, arguably, too easily adopt trade sanctions in the 
abovementioned examples of Uganda and Argentina under the old GATT 
system. This changed in 1995 with the inception of a more effective dispute 
settlement system.37
In the light of this it is worth mentioning that the question whether the 
implementation of selective public procurement policies is in violation of WTO 
law has already been raised with regard to legislation adopted by 
Massachusetts which prohibited state agencies from contracting with 
corporations doing business in Burma.
  
 
38 The European Union claimed that this 
policy was in violation of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement39
                                            
35  Strictly speaking the term ‘judiciary’ is not correct when referring to WTO panels and AB. 
The panels are established ad hoc and the legal findings of both the panels and the AB 
are recommendations that need to be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body in order for 
them to become binding. Nevertheless, the independent functioning of the panels and the 
AB in practice gives them a judicial character in the international law sense. Therefore the 
term judiciary will be used in this article. See Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms 442. 
36  It is worth noting that Maupain claims that the US considered the chance that Myanmar 
would go to the WTO to complain rather small in view of similar sanctions adopted by 
other countries. Supra n 26 at 114. 
37  Under the old GATT a procedure for dispute settlement already existed. Yet, this system 
did not prove to be very effective. Rulings could be easily blocked because they could only 
be adopted by consensus. Moreover, many cases dragged on for a long time 
inconclusively because of the lack of fixed timetables. Therefore, the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes was adopted in order to 
structure the system. It introduced deadlines set in various stages of the procedure and it 
became impossible for a losing country to block a ruling. 
38  Act of June 25th, 1996, ch 130, 1, 1996, Mass Acts 210, codified at Mass Gen L ch 7 22G-
22M. 
 as it 
39  Agreement on Government Procurement, opened for signature 15 April 1994 (entered into 
force on 1 January 1996), 1915 UNTS 103. Public procurement is exempted from the 
GATT. Contrary to the GATT the Agreement on Public Procurement is a plurilateral treaty 
and therefore only enforceable against Member States, which currently are Canada, 
European Communities (including its 25 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
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imposed conditions that were not essential to fulfil the contract and were based 
on political instead of economic considerations.40 The EU therefore requested 
consultation in the WTO.41 The Massachusetts law was also challenged in the 
domestic courts of the United States by the National Foreign Trade Council 
(NFTC), a coalition of corporations, which claimed that the Massachusetts law 
was unconstitutional as it infringed on the federal governments’ exclusive 
authority to regulate foreign affairs.42
As was discussed above, when comparing the WTO to many other international 
organisations, it should be concluded that the WTO only acts independently 
from its Member States in the field of Trade Policy Review, technical assistance 
and dispute settlement and only in the case of the latter can the organisation be 
an obstacle for the protection of human rights from a legal perspective. It 
 The case went to the Supreme Court, 
which ruled in favour of the NFTC. The EU then decided to withdraw their 
request for consultations and the case did not proceed any further within the 
WTO. As a result the WTO dispute settlement system has not yet had the 
opportunity to address the question whether public procurement policies that 
are selective in view of protecting human rights abroad are in violation of WTO 
law. 
 
The foregoing proves that it is not unlikely that the WTO judiciary at some point 
will be asked to rule on the legality of such trade measures. If it would decide 
that the measure taken in view of protecting fundamental norms are in fact a 
violation, WTO law would constitute an obstacle to the enforcement of these 
fundamental norms.  
 
 
3 What can the WTO do?  
                                                                                                                               
Korea, Liechtenstein, Netherlands with respect to Aruba, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, 
and United States. 
40  The EU and Japan considered this to be a violation of articles VIII (b), X and XIII of the 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. WTO Doc WT/DS88/1, GPA/DS2/1 United 
States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement, Request for Consultation by the 
European Communities, June 26, 1997. 
41  Id. 
42  National Foreign Trade Council v Baker 26 F Supp 2d 287, 291 (Mass 1998). 
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should however not be concluded that the WTO has no relevance for human 
rights beyond the activities discussed here. Even though the WTO as an 
international organisation does not directly violate human rights, the way the 
organisation works severally impacts the trade liberalisation agenda, which can 
have adverse effects on the promotion and protection of human rights.  
 
The approach of the WTO is an all or nothing approach –the so-called ‘Single 
Undertaking’– meaning that all WTO rules apply to all members and all WTO 
members must participate in (almost) all WTO treaty regimes. This approach 
limits the room for non-trade issues. Moreover, as pointed out by Howse,  
 
The fact that the WTO is based on consensus decision-making by 
delegates of Member governments has been invoked to suggest that 
there is no need for further accountability of the activities of the WTO 
as an institution. This ignores the considerable role of the Secretariat 
as well as particular delegates assigned for example as chairs of 
negotiating or other committees in the WTO to set agendas, “frame” 
the way that issues are discussed, make judgments that have 
normative impact about the meaning of WTO rules, and even (for 
example), the case of Secretariat reports with respect to the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) or technical assistance) to judge 
and advise the policymakers of individual WTO Members.43
3.1 The WTO and principles of good governance 
  
 
In other words, the way the most important institution advocating trade 
liberalisation goes about this process is vital. It is necessary that the WTO is 
receptive to human rights concerns to ensure that in the process of trade 
liberalisation ample room is provided for human rights considerations. 
 
What has the WTO done so far to contribute to an environment conducive to 
human rights? In other words what role do the principles of good governance 
play within the organisation? And what further steps can the WTO take? 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the doctrine of good governance in 
international organisations deals with processes that enhance transparency, 
                                            
43  Howse 2004 Rutgers L Rev 882. 
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participation and accountability. In this article two principles will be discussed 
that, arguably, are particularly relevant in the context of the WTO. These are 
the principles of participation and transparency. 
 
The principle of participation is of fundamental importance for any international 
organisation. It is a mistake to think that a state can adequately represent all 
voices. Increasingly, people join together out of concern for a certain topic that 
they feel might be better represented by an NGO across geographical and 
political borders than by their own government. Civil society can bring to the 
fore topics that would otherwise escape attention. The principle of participation 
is especially relevant for the WTO in light of the often voiced criticism that, 
notwithstanding the fact that legally all states have equal rights given the 
principle of consensus voting, in practice a couple of selected countries hold all 
the power. These countries set the agenda and negotiate the bargains that 
others are expected to take. This effect is strengthened by the WTO structure 
as a Single Undertaking referred to earlier. Furthermore, meaningful participat-
ion requires transparency. The WTO is often perceived as a rather arcane 
organisation. For civil society and others to participate in a meaningful manner 
they need to know what is going on. An often-voiced criticism towards the WTO 
is the secrecy especially surrounding the proceedings of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Enhancing transparency and participation in the institutional 
processes of the WTO will also contribute to other good governance principles 
such as accountability.44
                                            
44  In a strict legal sense it is not appropriate in the context of the WTO to use the term 
accountability. As discussed in s 2, the WTO differs from most other international 
organisations given the limited independence from its Member States. Accountability 
therefore lies primarily with these states. However, if accountability is taken as a broader 
concept where the organisation is required to render account for its actions towards its 
constituencies this good governance principle is also relevant in the light of the present 
article. 
 
 
The following section will discuss what so far has been done in the WTO 
concerning the principles of participation and transparency.  
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3.3.3 The principle of participation 
The WTO system is often considered a ‘closed’ system where non-state actors 
such as multinational corporations and NGOs are barred from participation. 
Beside non-state actors, international organisations also encounter problems 
trying to obtain access to discussions.45 The intention appears to have been 
different with the original International Trade Organisation (ITO) where during 
the negotiations a role for NGOs was envisaged. The idea was that NGOs 
would maintain regular contact with the ITO secretariat, receive unrestricted 
documents, propose agenda items and participate as observers and occasional 
speakers at conferences.46 The ITO, however, never came into being and the 
position of non-state actors at the GATT and successor the WTO is generally 
perceived as minimal. Is this perception indeed accurate? The legal provision 
governing the participation of NGOs in the WTO is article V (2) of the Final Act 
Uruguay Round (Marrakech agreement)47
Compared to the United Nations, where NGO participation is generally 
considered to be well established
, which reads  
 
[t]he General Council may make appropriate arrangements for 
consultation and co-operation with non-governmental organizations 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. 
 
48 based on article 71 of the UN Charter,49
What has the WTO done to give effect to this provision? In 1996, the General 
Council drew up Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-
 
this provision potentially is far-reaching as it also speaks of co-operation and 
not merely consultation. 
 
                                            
45  Howse 2003 Eur LJ 497. 
46  Loy Public Participation 116; Charnovitz 1996 U PA J Int’l Econ L 331-357. 
47  The Agreement establishing the WTO, supra n 8. 
48  This should not be taken to imply that no problems exist. For the threats to NGO 
participation in the UN see Kamminga Evolving Status of NGOs 93-111. 
49  Art 71 reads: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within 
its competence (…)”. 
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Governmental Organisations.50
…a more active role in its direct contacts with NGOs who, as a 
valuable resource, can contribute to the accuracy and richness of the 
public debate.
 According to these guidelines, the Secretariat 
was given the task of playing  
 
51
In general, the Guidelines are perceived as containing only marginal 
commitments for informal dialogue.
  
 
52
Nevertheless, in recent years, the WTO has undertaken a number of important 
activities to strengthen the informal participation of the public at large and 
NGOs in particular.
 The Guidelines contain the following firm 
statement:  
 
[T]here is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible 
for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its 
meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also 
be met constructively though appropriate processes at the national 
level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the 
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on 
trade policy-making. 
 
53 The WTO has reached out to NGOs by organising 
symposia and day-to-day contact between the WTO secretariat and NGOs. In 
1998, a programme of regular meetings between the External Relations 
Division and NGOs on the work of WTO committees and working groups was 
set up. A special section for NGOs issues was created on the WTO website 
and the WTO secretariat circulates NGO position papers. In 1996, the General 
Council decided to permit NGOs attendance at the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore.54
                                            
50  WTO Doc WT/L/162 Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, July 23rd 
1996. 
51  Part IV of the Guidelines. 
52  Willetts Representation of private organizations 53; International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development Public Participation in the International Trading System. 
Accreditation Schemes and Other Arrangements for Public participation in International 
Fora. A contribution to the debate on WTO and transparency, International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development, November 1999. 
53  For a survey of this history see Charnovitz 2000 Fordham Int’l LJ 173-216.  
54  According to the website of the WTO 108 NGOs took part in this Ministerial Conference.  
 A practice has developed of providing NGOs that “are 
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concerned with matters related to those of the WTO” a kind of accreditation to 
attend plenary sessions.55
In the dispute settlement system the possibilities of participation by NGOs are 
limited. The WTO dispute settlement system is an inter-state system; only 
Member States can bring a case before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
 NGOs cannot attend any of the committees.  
 
56 
Other WTO members with a substantial interest in the dispute may intervene as 
third parties.57 Formally, therefore, there is no room for NGOs to participate in 
the legal proceedings of the WTO judiciary. However, in practice Member 
States frequently bring cases before the WTO DSB after considerable pressure 
from non-state entities such as multinational corporations. It has been stated 
that non-state entities representing business interests therefore have indirect 
access to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.58
In several cases, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have been confronted 
with un-requested amicus curiae submissions in the course of their proceedings 
mostly from NGOs with an environmental interest and from business 
associations. Neither the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) nor the 
Working Procedures for Appellate Review contain a provision on whether or not 
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs are admissible in the WTO proceedings. 
However, according to article 13 DSU, WTO panels do have the authority “to 
seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it 
deems appropriate”. Based on this provision and the fact that panels are 
required to make an objective assessment (art. 11 DSU), the Appellate Body 
has slightly opened the doors for NGO participation in the form of amicus curiae 
submissions. The first time a WTO panel motivated a decision on whether it 
 Nevertheless, only states have 
direct access to the dispute settlement system.  
 
                                            
55  The number of NGOs participating in the ensuing Ministerial Conferences amounted to: 
128 in Geneva (1998); 686 in Seattle (1999); 370 in Doha (2001); 795 in Cancun (2003) 
and 821 in Hong Kong (2005). Information available on the WTO website.  
56  The WTO Agreement Annex 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994) (DSU).  
57  Art 10, par 2 Annex 2, WTO Agreement. 
58  For more on this influence of corporations on the proceedings before the WTO judiciary, 
see Reinisch and Irgel 2001 Non-State Actors and International Law 137-138; Schaffer 
Defending Interests; Van den Bossche Hoe kan het beter? [How can it be improved? 
Prevention of trade wars by the WTO.] 
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had legal authority to accept amicus curiae briefs was in 1998 in the US-Shrimp 
case.59 In the course of the proceedings, the WTO panel sought advice from a 
group of experts. It also received two amicus curiae briefs from NGOs.60 The 
panel, in a restrictive interpretation of its mandate, decided it had no authority to 
take these briefs into consideration, as it had not requested such information.61 
However, on appeal the Appellate Body overturned the decision of the panel 
stating that accepting non-requested information from NGO sources is not 
incompatible with the DSU and observed that panels have the discretionary 
authority either to accept or to reject information, whether requested or not.62 
Since this decision, WTO panels have been confronted with unsolicited 
submissions by NGOs on a number of occasions. In most cases, the panels 
have decided not to accept such briefs. In various cases, panels have indicated 
a preference for amicus curiae briefs to be annexed to the submissions of the 
parties to the dispute, therewith using the parties as a ‘filter’.63
Amicus curiae participation has also been allowed at the appellate level by the 
Appellate Body which believes such a right flows from its broad authority to 
adopt procedural rules, provided they do not conflict with the DSU or the 
covered agreements.
 
 
64
                                            
59  WTO Doc WT/DS58/R United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products 15 May 1998 (hereinafter: Shrimp/Turtle case), par 7.8. In two cases in 1996 (on 
Hormones and Gasoline) NGOs also submitted amicus curiae briefs but the WTO panels 
rejected these without further explanation.  
60  The Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law, 
both based in the US 
61  Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 59, par 7.8. 
62  WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R Shrimp/Turtle Case Report of the Appellate Body 12 October 
1998, par 108-109.  
63  Eg, in the Softwood lumber case the panel received an amicus brief from the NGO 
Northwest Ecosystem Alliance. In the report of the Panel of 22 March 2004 (WTO Doc 
WT/DS277/R) the panel states (in a footnote): “Having carefully considered the question of 
how to treat that communication, and any further such communications that might be 
received, and in the light of the absence of consensus amongst WTO members on the 
question of how to treat amicus submissions: we decided not to accept unsolicited amicus 
curiae submissions in the course of this dispute” (n 75). The Panel went on to state that 
arguments that were raised by amici will only be examined to the extent they are taken up 
in the written submissions of the parties to the dispute. 
64  Art 17.9 DSU. The AB first considered this issue in the case United States – Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
originating in the United Kingdom WTO Doc WT/DS138/AB/R adopted 7 June 2000, DSR 
2000:V, 2601, par 43. 
 The discretion to accept unsolicited amicus curiae 
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submissions lies with the Appellate Body and so far none have been 
considered to be pertinent or useful.  
 
NGOs participating in the WTO dispute settlement procedures as ‘friends of the 
court’ have caused considerable controversy. Member States reacted fiercely 
to the decision to allow for amicus curiae participation. On behalf of the Informal 
Group of Developing Countries, Egypt requested an extraordinary meeting of 
the WTO General Council.65
3.3.4 The principle of transparency 
 The vast majority of the Member States alleged 
that the Appellate Body trespassed its own mandate and had unduly acted as a 
legislator. Only the United States, New Zealand and Switzerland supported the 
Appellate Body decision to allow for amicus curiae submissions.  
 
It can be concluded that NGOs acting as amicus curiae – at least in theory – 
have found their way into WTO proceedings. However, despite this in practice 
most submissions are rejected with little or no explanation. This has, 
nevertheless, not stopped NGOs from acting as friends of the court.  
 
To be able to participate in the WTO it is necessary that the organisation is 
transparent. What has the WTO done over the years to increase transparency? 
 
A number of Member States, notably the United States during the Clinton 
administration, have pushed an agenda for reform in the area of transparency 
urging for greater transparency within the WTO.66 The WTO has responded to 
demands for greater release of information concerning WTO policymaking, 
most notably by constructing an elaborate website. In 2002, a long debated 
decision was taken on earlier de-restriction of documents.67
                                            
65  WTO Doc WT/GC/M/60 General Council, minutes of the meeting of 22 November 2000. 
66  See, eg, the statement made by president Clinton at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Geneva on 18 May 1998; Loy supra n 46 at 113-136.  
67  WTO Doc WT/L/452 Procedures for the de-restriction and circulation of WTO documents 
16 May 2002. 
 Negotiating 
proposals are now public; they have generally been made accessible and can 
therefore be publicly scrutinised. However, the idea of transparency does not 
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seem to have been mainstreamed throughout the whole organisation. Howse 
mentions as an example the negotiations on sectoral commitments that remain 
confidential.68
Accusations of secrecy have been targeted especially at the dispute settlement 
system where proceedings before the panels and the Appellate Body take 
place behind closed doors. A proposal to open up panel and Appellate Body 
procedures was already put forward by the United States in 1999. In August 
2005, the DSB decided at the request of the parties involved in the EC-
Hormones dispute
 
 
69 that the proceedings before the panel would be open to 
the public through a closed circuit TV Broadcast. Meetings with third parties 
remained closed, as not all parties agreed to have the proceedings open to the 
public. This was the first time that the WTO agreed to partly open proceedings 
to the public. The second time – and at the time of writing – last time that the 
WTO agreed to public panel proceeding was in the case of United States – 
Measures affecting Large Civil Aircraft in March 2007.70
3.2 The Sutherland report 
 This was again the 
result of explicit request by the parties in the case, the EC and the US. 
 
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary the WTO published the report entitled 
The Future of the WTO – known as the Sutherland report after the chairman of 
the commission that drafted the report − which reflects on the state of the WTO 
and the institutional challenges ahead.71
One entire chapter of the nine-chapter Sutherland report is devoted to 
‘transparency and dialogue with civil society’.
  
 
72
                                            
68  Howse supra n 43 at 883-884. 
69  WTO Doc WT/DS320 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc WT/DS321 Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 27-28 September 2006 and 2-3 October 2006. 
70  WTO Doc WT/DS316 United States – Measures affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 20-
21 March 2007. 
 This demonstrates the 
importance of this relationship for the future of the WTO. Nevertheless, it might 
71  Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Suachai Panitchpakdi, see 
Sutherland et al http://www.wto.org/ 25 Jun. 
72  See ch V: Transparency and dialogue with civil society, par 176-212.  
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be telling that, as pointed out by several observers73
The report draws the conclusion that “much has been achieved in the area of 
external transparency over the past few years”
 that the report was drafted 
by ‘insiders’ without wide consultation and deliberation. The report in general 
reflects a rather guarded, defensive approach and has not generated the public 
discussion hoped for.  
 
74 and recommends that the 
WTO membership should develop a set of clear objectives for the WTO’s 
relationship with civil society and the public at large.75 The report discusses the 
pros and cons of a more formal accreditation system for NGOs.76
[a]part from the attendance at the plenary sessions of Ministerial 
meetings every two years, it is unlikely that accreditation would 
mean the right to observe WTO meetings at first hand.
 Doubts are 
raised whether a formal accreditation system is a worthy investment for the 
WTO, given the bureaucratic burden; possibly a simple ad hoc registration 
system could suffice. Furthermore, the report states clearly that  
 
77
Regarding the dispute settlement system, the report states that overall there is 
a sense of satisfaction with the system. The most important underlying 
assumption is that reform proposals should be approached carefully as no 
harm must be done to the existing system since it has so many valuable 
attributes.
  
 
78
those, intimately involved in these proceedings see important need 
to develop general criteria and procedures at both [the panel and the 
Appellate Body] levels, to fairly and appropriately handle amicus 
submissions, balancing worries about resource implications with 
fairness and a general recognition that such submissions can in 
some instances improve the overall quality of the dispute settlement 
process.
 However, regarding NGOs handing in amicus curiae briefs, the 
report states that  
 
79
                                            
73  Howse supra n 43; Pauwelyn 2005 JIEL 329-346. 
74  Sutherland report, supra n 71 par 211. 
75  Id. 
76  Ibid par 207-208. 
77  Ibid par 207. 
78  Ibid par 254. 
79  Ibid par 260. 
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Concerning the degree of confidentiality of the dispute settlement proceedings 
the report acknowledges that this may be damaging to the WTO as an 
institution. Therefore, the report recommends that the first level panel hearings 
and Appellate Body hearings should generally be open to the public. Opening 
up parts of the dispute settlement proceedings to the public is however 
considered to be more complex as this requires consensus among the Member 
States. 80
the primary responsibility for engaging civil society in trade policy 
matters rests with the members themselves.
 
 
In sum, in the Sutherland report the Consultative Board acknowledged the 
importance of participation and transparency for the WTO and put forward 
some interesting proposals. Nevertheless, the general point of view of the WTO 
towards the relationship with civil society for the future is summed up by stating 
that  
 
81
Even though significant steps have been taken by the WTO in recent years to 
enhance transparency and the possibilities of participation the organisation 
does not seem to have taken on the good governance effort in the same 
manner as other organisations such as the World Bank have. This no doubt is 
partly the result of the character of the organisation as a member driven 
organisation. However, as pointed out earlier, the distinctive character does not 
mean that the WTO does not have an impact on the enjoyment of human 
rights. In order to create a human rights sensitive environment the organisation 
needs to do more than it currently does. What steps can the organisation take 
to further increase respect for the good governance principles of transparency 
  
 
 
3.3 What future steps can the WTO take? 
                                            
80  Ibid par 262. 
81  Ibid par 212. 
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and participation that will help create a climate sensitive to human rights 
concerns? 
 
3.3.1 Participation 
A suggestion to improve non-judicial NGO participation would be to actively 
involve NGOs in the so-called Trade Policy Review Mechanism. As previously 
discussed, the final report reviewing the national policies of a Member State is 
drawn up by the Trade Policy Review Body, based on the report of the Member 
State and a report drawn up by the WTO secretariat. The decision on the Trade 
Policy Review does not refer to any input from NGOs. In this area, the human 
rights practice can serve as a source of inspiration. Various human rights 
treaties require states’ parties to submit periodic reports.82 It is a well-
established practice for NGOs to submit parallel reports that are accepted and 
taken into consideration by the human rights monitoring bodies. A similar role 
can be taken up by NGOs in the Trade Policy Review system. This is 
necessary as practices in Member States towards human rights violations can 
severely impact the trading system.83
Furthermore, codification of the rules regarding the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs is long overdue. In light of the fact that WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body are increasingly confronted with issues beyond the technical 
aspects of trade liberalisation, expertise input from NGOs on public interest 
issues should be welcomed. Nevertheless, the case-to-case approach remains 
in place despite calls from Member States (notably the USA and the European 
 
 
                                            
82  For an overview of this practice before the various international human rights bodies see, 
Jägers 2006 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 229-271. 
83  In the early years of GATT trade negotiations were mainly focused on tariff reductions. For 
the first time non-tariff measures were discussed in the Kennedy Round of 1963-1967. 
Measures such as dumping or product standards increasingly were considered to have an 
impact on international trade. Consequently, such non-tariff policies became an integral 
part of future negotiation rounds. Not surprisingly, some states claimed that different 
domestic policies regarding labour standards also may lead to unfair competition. To put it 
bluntly, they were in favour of the inclusion of a so-called ‘social clause’ in WTO law which 
would allow states to use trade restrictions against countries where basic workers’ rights 
are not respected because of its impact on international trade. 
J DENKERS & N JÄGERS  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
112/252 
Community) and scholars84
In the absence of a standardised procedure for amicus curiae briefs the WTO 
panels and Appellate Body could also seek more NGO input in the form of an 
expert opinion especially when confronted with disputes that touch on non-
trade issues such as human rights. Besides authorising WTO panels to seek 
information from any relevant source, article 13 (2) DSU
 to formulate a standard procedure for the 
acceptance of such submissions. As mentioned earlier, the Sutherland report 
on the future of the WTO also emphasised the need for general rules. 
 
85
strengthen the rule of law in international trade by enhancing the 
legitimacy and acceptance of WTO rules by in particular (…) 
[a]llowing individual parties, both natural and corporate, an advisory 
locus standi in those dispute settlement procedures where their own 
rights and interests are affected.
 also authorises WTO 
panels to consult with experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the 
matter. This article gives considerable flexibility to WTO panels to involve 
NGOs that have shown interest in providing information as experts. The 
authority to seek and accept expert advice is discretionary and in practice WTO 
panels have requested such contributions in only very few instances. Such 
expert opinion should also be made public. 
 
A more far-reaching suggestion was made by the International Law Association 
in 2000 when it recommended that WTO members should  
 
86
                                            
84  See, ia, the practical suggestions for the use of amicus curiae briefs submitted by Marceau 
and Stilwell 2001 JIEL 155-187.  
85  Under art 11 (2) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Member States are admonished to seek expert opinion. Under art 14, annex 2 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade they are permitted to do so. 
86  ILA Report of the sixty-ninth conference held in London, 25-29 July 2000, Res No 2/2000, 
annex 3. 
  
 
NGOs could play a part in advising whether certain national measures fall 
within the exceptions of article XX that allow for trade sanctions “necessary to 
protect human (…) health (XX b) and ‘relating to the products of prison labour” 
(XX e). 
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Enhancing public participation in the WTO will further the sustainable 
development agenda of the WTO. Various international documents such as the 
Rio Declaration87 and Agenda 2188
3.3.2 Transparency 
 have made clear that to achieve 
sustainable development public participation is a prerequisite  
 
What steps can the WTO take to further increase transparency within the 
organisation? 
 
As stated earlier, the influence of specific individuals and the secretariat on the 
agenda of trade liberalisation is considerable. It has been suggested that more 
transparent processes might be required for the appointment of seniors in the 
secretariat and the Appellate Body.89 Moreover, as acknowledged by the 
Consultative Board in the Sutherland report the dispute settlement proceedings 
need to be opened up to the public as far as possible. Currently, this is only 
possible at the explicit request of Member States as occurred in the EC-
Hormones dispute and the Measures affecting Large Civil Aircraft case. It is 
likely that cases between the EC and the US90
The suggestions mentioned here illustrate possible ways in which the WTO can 
further improve its transparency and the possibilities for participation. It is clear 
that trade negotiations up to a point require certain confidentiality and in 
practice therefore limits will be set to the amount of openness possible. 
 will be more open to the public 
in the future as these members are strong supporters of transparency. Other 
WTO Member States, however, remain very opposed to opening up 
proceedings. It is desirable that WTO Member States find agreement on this 
issue making it a rule rather than the exception. Transparency in judicial 
proceedings in the sense of being open to the public is considered a necessity 
both at the national and the international level. There is no reason why the 
WTO should treat it judicial disputes any differently. 
 
                                            
87  UN Doc A/CONF/151/26 (Vol 1); 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
88  UN GAOR 46th session, agenda item 21, UN Doc A/COLNF/151/26 (1992). 
89  Howse supra n 43 at 882. 
90  These two WTO members make the most frequent use of the dispute settlement system. 
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Moreover, increasing avenues of participation for non-state entities such as 
NGOs brings with it important questions concerning their legitimacy and 
accountability. It is beyond the scope of this article to address these vital 
issues91 suffice it to say that many other international organisations have been 
successful in addressing these issues and incorporating a significant role for 
NGOs into their procedures without threatening the intergovernmental 
character of their organisations.92
The WTO has been the focal point of anti-globalisation critique claiming the 
detrimental effect of the activities of the organisation for the protection and 
enjoyment of human rights. To a certain extent this critique is based on 
misconceptions about the role of the organisation. Compared to other 
international organisations the WTO hardly operates independently from its 
Member States. Although it cannot be denied that it has some autonomous 
powers, the organisation as such does not directly violate human rights for 
which it can be held accountable. Nevertheless, its activities may have human 
rights implications. In the light of this, we discussed the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and technical 
assistance. From a legal perspective, only the former may have a direct impact 
on domestic state policies for the protection of human rights because it may 
require a state to adapt certain trade related human rights policies. Evidently, it 
primarily concerns policies for the protection of human rights (say, the right to 
health) within a state’s own jurisdiction. Yet, it has also been illustrated that it is 
feasible that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism at some point will be 
asked to rule on the lawfulness of trade restrictions for the protection of human 
rights elsewhere. This shows that human rights considerations are of particular 
relevance for the dispute settlement mechanism. Human rights considerations, 
  
 
 
4 Conclusion  
                                            
91  There is abundant literature on the issue of legitimacy of NGOs. See, ia, Bluemel 2004 
Brook J Int’l L 139; Edwards and Zadek Governing 200-224; Slim By What Authority; 
Charnovitz 2004 JIEL 675-682. 
92  Jägers supra n 82. 
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however, may also be relevant for activities that do not bind the Member States 
and may have a normative impact such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
and technical assistance. 
 
It is here where principles of good governance can play an important role. 
Serious deficiencies in the field of transparency and participation in the past 
have contributed to suspicion and hostility that the organisation has 
encountered. The tide of good governance has, however, not completely 
bypassed the WTO. In recent years the organisation has taken significant steps 
to enhance its transparency and the possibility for participation by non-state 
entities. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be done to help secure a human rights 
responsive environment within the WTO. 
 
The need is all the greater in the dispute settlement mechanism as it is more 
than likely that the WTO will be confronted with more difficult and controversial 
cases also involving human rights issues. There is, therefore, an ever-
increasing need for transparency and greater participation in these proceedings 
by actors representing such issues.  
 
Future developments as suggested in this article will help, on the one hand 
ensure that the WTO does not pose an obstacle in the realisation of human 
rights, and on the other hand help sensitise the organisation for human rights 
considerations.  
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